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The main focus of this paper is on real and nominal exchange rates in the long run, and the 
relationships they bear to real interest rates, inflation, output, capital and other assets.  We 
seek to solve for equilibrium values of real and nominal exchange rates, along with other key 
endogenous variables to which they are linked – stocks of capital, currency and debt, flows of 
output and rates of interest.  The point of departure from standard models is that residents of 
different countries are assumed to discount utility at different rates.  What will keep cross-
border claims finite in the steady state in the model proposed in this paper is an assumption 
that agents care, in addition to regular goods, about their net wealth, with an increasing 
aversion to financial instruments denominated in an alien currency.       
 
 
Here are a number of questions on which this paper aims to throw light: 
 
(i)  Do free international capital movements mean that real interest differentials across 
currencies have to vanish in the absence of the usual risk premia?  Why might they 
not vanish? 
(ii)  How can we avoid Lucas’s disagreeable result (Lucas, 1992) that, when agents (or 
countries) differ in rates of time preference, the most far sighted own everything in 
the steady state? 
(iii)  What determines the currency mix in which foreign lending is conducted? 
(iv)  Does greater indebtedness imply a lower or a higher real exchange rate in the long 
run?  What else governs the equilibrium real exchange rate, and why? 
(v)  How and why might inflation affect output and debt levels at home and abroad? 
(vi)  What explains and determines long run levels of inter-country claims? 
(vii)  What else, besides relative nominal money supplies, do equilibrium nominal 
exchange rates depend upon? 
(viii)  How does removal of restrictions on international lending affect welfare in lending 
and borrowing countries? 
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This paper explores the effects of (and limits to) international lending with bonds.  
There are no equity trades across borders, nor direct foreign investment.  The focus is 
on steady states, and the simplest functional forms for preferences and technology are 
employed to ease exposition and pinpoint results.  The physical capital that each 
country accumulates is assumed to be constructed directly from its own exportable 
product: but the sheer presence of capital as an explicit factor of production is a point 
worthy of note, since capital is unfortunately an absentee in many contemporary 
models regarded as canonical (such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)).   And a central 
feature of the argument of this paper is that domestic and foreign residents discount 








This paper presents a long run, two-country model of floating exchange rates, where agents’ 
decisions are driven by optimization conditions.    One main feature that needs to be 
incorporated is the idea that residents of one country prefer not to have claims, or obligations, 
expressed in the currency of another.   There is a home currency bias in this respect.     
Exchange rate uncertainty and transactions costs will be prime considerations underlying this.   
The model below captures the idea by introducing a subjective marginal cost of holding assets 
or debts denominated in foreign (as opposed to domestic) currency, which increases linearly 
with their size.   
 
 
A debtor who has issued claims in his own currency – which we are assuming to be 
unindexed - has an incentive to generate surprise devaluation, since that would reduce the real 
burden of servicing them.  The size of this incentive increases with the scale of his obligations 
– hence the notion that the creditor will be increasingly reluctant to hold them as that scale 
goes up.  Similarly a creditor holding unindexed claims against foreigners denominated in the 
creditor’s currency has an incentive to generate a revaluation, unanticipated when they were 
issued, and this temptation increases with the magnitude of those claims.  What follows will   4
depict an equilibrium where such time inconsistent behaviour does not in fact occur.  The 
power of each to act that way is counterbalanced by the other’s.  But the thought that 
surprises of this kind could occur is what limits the scale of loans of both kinds.    
 
 
Net claims in home or foreign currency, which could be positive or negative, along with 
domestic capital and real balances of home currency, are all assets for which individuals will 
presumably choose optimal accumulation paths.  Their choices will also extend to labour, and 
to purchases of domestic and foreign goods.    
 
 
For a variety of reasons, residents of different countries may exhibit different rates of time 
preference.    To the extent that discount rates may reflect probabilities of death, life 
expectations could differ, for example.   So might attitudes to heirs.  Family links may be not 
as durable in one country as another (a greater prospect of divorce may lead couples to save 
less (or more) than they might have chosen otherwise, as a result of a “tragedy of the 
commons” or other effects).   Countries might differ in their perceived probabilities of 
financial crime and property theft, or in the insurance premia needed to cover such risks.   
Corporate and political institutions may take key decisions with greater myopia in one polity 
than another.  And finally people in different countries might simply wish to have differently 
shaped time profiles of consumption.    
 
 
If discount rates do differ across countries, some feature needs to be added if one is to avoid 
the depressing conclusion that the most patient will end up owning everything.  The important 
findings of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) illustrate the fact that this is certainly not the case 
at present.  Virtually all countries studied have claims on (and obligations to) each other.  The 
device explored in this paper is the notion that utility depends upon net wealth as well as the 
traditional goods of leisure and consumption.  But within the definition of net wealth, pride of 
place, with special emphasis, goes to real balances of local currency.  This captures the idea 
that titles to physical capital and other non-monetary claims are nothing like as good as cash 
for smoothing consumption in the face of shocks, but may still be able to perform that 
function to some degree.  There is quite a well-established tradition of allowing utility to 
include real money holdings, and, in the open economy context, this usually means domestic 
currency.  So one way of thinking of the modest innovation to agents’ utility functions to be 
shown below is that non-cash assets are added in here, at a relative discount.   Another is to   5
treat the new term as one in net wealth, essentially a portfolio, which displays an additional 
weight on real local currency holdings.   
 
 
The exogenous variables in the system are parameters governing preferences and technology, 
and nominal money supply paths assumed to be set by governments or central banks (in this 
respect the model is rather traditional: central banks do not explicitly, as in Woodford (2003), 
set nominal interest rates).  But the results can be reinterpreted to cover cases where the 
monetary authorities are in fact nominal interest rate setters, assuming that they determine 
them, in the long run, at the (neutral) point of Fisherian equilibrium where they cover the sum 
of the inflation and real interest rates exactly.  The focus will be on steady states with full 
information, price flexibility and perfect competition.   The simplest, Cobb Douglas 
functional forms for preferences and technology are adopted, to aid the identification and 
interpretation of concrete solutions.  
 
 
Although there are some new features of this model, which yield interesting conclusions, it 
must be admitted at the outset that there are others that limit its scope.   The main focus will 
be on the steady state, and much less upon how it is reached.   Partly for this reason, short-run 
considerations such as nominal inertia in prices are set aside.  So, too, is imperfect 
competition.  Keynesian features are therefore very limited.   But there is one – until relaxed 
later in the paper – which has powerful (if controversial) implications.   This is the 








Consider the following optimization problem for each of the residents of the home country, 
all of whom are assumed similar in preferences and endowments, and to display unit mass: 
maximize Φ  which is given by: 
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with the decision date t=0.  Here  f h c c , denote consumption of home produced and foreign 
goods;  h is labour supply, and k capital; m is the nominal domestic money supply, and 
D D*,  are claims in foreign and domestic currency respectively.  Nominal interest rates are r 
and  r*.  S and X are the nominal price of foreign currency and real exchange rate (X= 
h f P S P / ), where  f h P P , are local-currency nominal prices of home and foreign goods.   An 
overdot denotes a time derivative.  ) (t Ω  is nominal seignorage, returned to the individual as a 
lump sum.  The budget constraint in (1) is couched in nominal terms from the standpoint of a 
home currency resident.   
 
 
The non-standard element in utility is the fourth “good”, the term introduced by the 
parameterζ .  This may be thought of as “amplified” real money.  It is written as real money, 
multiplied by a coefficient σ , plus real wealth.  All the terms in this expression are deflated 
by the nominal price of home goods.  But since the Cobb Douglas tastes give the implicit 
price index as 
η η η − − =
1 1 ) ( X P S P P h f h ,  nX l ) 1 ( η − is subtracted from direct utility to capture 
the adverse effect of a terms of trade deterioration.  If σ is very large, the fourth good is 
overwhelmingly dominated by money holdings, and other forms of net wealth become 
relatively unimportant.  There are several reasons for handling wealth and money in this way.   
 
 
Part of the justification for putting money into the utility function is because of its outstanding 
convenience as a resource-saving transactions medium.  But it is not unthinkable that title 
deeds to other assets, if, as assumed here, perfectly divisible, could also perform this function, 
though much less well of course, if real money were for some reason unavailable.  Secondly, 
to the extent that money is held as a precautionary fund to smooth consumption in the face of 
shocks, non-money assets can be collateralized to do this too.    Then there is the idea that the 
possession of both money and (to a lesser extent) non-money assets confers on the holder the 
freedom and flexibility to take timely advantage of investment or purchasing opportunities,   7
for example.    The analysis that follows abstracts from these issues, and does not model them 
specifically.   
 
 
Another feature of the wealth-amplified money term is that it reflects an increasing marginal 
distaste for acquiring claims denominated in foreign currency.  The strength of this bias 
towards home-currency denominated claims is captured by the parameter ξ .   The reason for 
this is that debtors can surprise (and rob) creditors holding claims in debtor currency by 
unexpectedly devaluing their external and internal value.   The larger the stock of such claims, 
the more the debtor country would stand to gain by doing this.   But the debtor will have a 
symmetric concern that the creditor can unexpectedly revalue credits denominated in creditor 
currency: hence the debtor’s decreasing willingness to issue them, modelled in the section 
that follows.   In the steady state, it is assumed that these fears are unrealized.  Yet that does 
not mean that they are irrational.  One could imagine that the monetary authorities of each 
country are deterred from such time-inconsistent actions by the power of the other’s to 
retaliate.     
 
 
First order conditions for consumption of the two goods and labour imply the following 
intratemporal equalities  
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Here,  ) ( / )) ( ), ( ( 2 t h t h t k f f ∂ ∂ = , the marginal product of labour.  The proportionate rate of 
decline of λ  may therefore be written as  t c P n h h ∂ ∂ + / ) ( l β , which reduces to  π β + in the 
steady state with π  the home currency rate of inflation for domestic goods. 
 
 
For each of the assets  i a , the first order Euler condition for an interior intertemporal 
equilibrium is  t t a t a i i ∂ ∂ Φ ∂ ∂ = ∂ Φ ∂
•
/ )} ( / { ) ( / .  Applying these conditions on k(t),  D(t),   
D*(t), and  m(t) establishes that, in the steady state (when X is stationary): 
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where  ] ) 2 / * 1 ( * ) 1 [( [ D P S D S D m k h + − + + + ≡ Λ ξ σ /P h ], our term in wealth-amplified 
money.   
 
 
One of the implications of (3), which follows from the Euler conditions on capital and home 
currency claims D, is that the marginal product of capital, , 1 f  will equal the real own-rate of 
interest on home goods.   Another (revealed by combining the Euler conditions on D and 
money), is that this real rate, R let us call it, will equal 
 
) 1 /( ) ( σ π βσ π + − = − = r R .                                                                               (4)           
 
This domestic real interest rate tends towards the time preference rate, β , as σ  becomes 
very large; but with finite σ , it falls below β provided that the nominal price of domestic 
goods trends upwards, or if downwards, at a rate smaller than β .   Equation (4) bears a 
second interpretation: the monetary authority may set the nominal rate of interest on its 
currency, and thus, implicitly in the steady state, its rate of inflation (we may rewrite (4) as 
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The intratemporal first order conditions for this problem link consumption of the two goods 
and labour. They imply 
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and, therefore, that the proportionate rate of decline of the marginal utility of nominal income 
is given by  ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( ˆ
1 t U t t − + = − π β λ . 
 
The intertemporal conditions are extensions of those considered above, with qualitatively 








The next stage is to model the foreign economy.  We shall assume for the moment that 
foreign residents, like domestic residents, have unit mass.  Agents there will be presumed to 
differ in preferences from their home counterparts in five respects.  First, they are less patient: 
their rate of discount,  * β , is larger than at home.  Second, their intratemporal utility from 
home and foreign goods, call these  * h c , and  * f c , respectively, will be 
*)] *) 1 ( * * }[ 1 { f h nc nc l l η η ζ θ − + − − .  There is home bias in preferences if and only if 
* η η > .   Third, for them, D* and D represent obligations, not claims, so their sign in the 
wealth-amplified money term is reversed.  Fourth, home currency money is replaced by 
foreign currency money, m*,  since it is this that they will use in purchases.   Finally, 
foreigners have an increasing marginal dislike of obligations denominated in the home 
currency, D.   
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At each instant foreigners must respect a nominal budget constraint 
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and maximize  * Φ  subject to them, where: 
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and from these conditions it follows that µ  must decline (proportionately) at the rate  
 
* * / *) ( * π β β + → ∂ +∂ t c P n f f l  in the steady state. 
 
The Euler conditions for the problem, meanwhile, entail for the steady state: 
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where  R*   is the own real rate of interest on goods made abroad, and 
) / ) 2 / 1 ( * ) 1 ( * ( * * h h P P D D S D S m X k ξ σ − + + + + = Λ .  Equation (8) reveals that this 
will equal the marginal product of capital abroad.   Furthermore, we may express R* as 
 
        r*-π *=   ) 1 /( *) * ( * σ π σ β + − = R .                                              (9) 
 
Another implication of (8) is that it expresses the steady state level of foreigners’ home 
currency debt, D, in terms of R and R*.  But equation (3) did the same for home residents’ 
claims in foreign currency.  Combining (3) and (8) we obtain 
 
        D*S/D =  ξ β β ) /( *) * ( R R − − .                                                        (10) 
 
What limits claims in home currency is foreigners’ increasing reluctance to issue them; what 
restricts claims in foreign currency is home citizens’ increasing unwillingness to hold them.  
Together, these restrictions imply a determinate long run value for the debt charges that 
foreigners will pay to home residents, in units of home goods: 
 
ξ β β / *)] * /( ) /( * )[ * ( / ) * * ( R R R R R R P DR SR D h − + − − = + ≡ Γ         (11) 
 
These charges depend on local-currency rates of inflation for the two goods (taken to be 
policy parameters) and four preference parameters.  These last capture aversion to financial 
instruments in alien currency (ξ ), the degree of primacy of money in wealth  ) (σ , and rates 
of impatience at home and abroad.  Scrutiny reveals that Γincreases with  * β , and decreases 
with  β , given that  β β > * .  The greater the difference between the two countries’ time 
preference rates, the larger these claims will be.   
 
 
A further feature of (11) that merits emphasis is the fact that real interest rates do not 
equalize.  This carries the implication that, in the steady state, the nominal interest differential 
does not match the trend in the nominal exchange rate.  So uncovered interest parity fails to 
hold.  The nominal interest rate on financial instruments denominated in the debtor’s currency 
exceeds what the UIP condition would predict. The size of this gap is proportional to real debt 
charges.  This is not really a “peso problem” of a conceivable future devaluation; rather, it 
reflects the consequences of assuming that claimants and debtors both display an increasing   12
reluctance to hold claims or debts in an alien currency, and the balance of temptation and 
possible punishment constraining both monetary authorities in equilibrium.       
 
 
If real rates of interest in the two currencies were equal, there would be a zero level of debt 
charges and a zero level of claims by home residents on those abroad.  With inflation rates 
similar, that could only happen if the two countries’ impatience rates were equal.  But a 
glance at equations (4) and (9) shows that inflation differences matter too.  Real interest rates 
for one currency are negatively related to the trend in the nominal price of the goods produced 
by the country that issues it.  When, as seems all too likely, real balances dominate non-
money assets strongly, so that σ  is large, the size of this influence will be very modest.  So 
cross country impatience differences are not the only potential cause of enduring cross 
country claims: persistent inflation differences could also generate them.  And the chance of a 
country being a long term debtor increases when its long term inflation rate falls.  
 
 
This is a curious finding.  Why does it arise?  The mechanism is this.  Faster inflation at home 
reduces the demand for real local currency, entirely as one would expect.  Circulation velocity 
increases.  Lower real money balances increase the demand for local capital.  They also 
strengthen the demand for overseas claims – like capital, a partial substitute for the now 
reduced stock of real money.  If the country was a marginal net debtor before the rise in 
inflation, the consequent fall in real money holdings could well tilt into repaying its external 
obligations and acquiring net overseas claims.   That is the mechanism at work here.   
 
 
Put another way, a debtor reduces its real overseas debt charges by raising its rate of inflation.  
But this is not the consequence of an unexpected once-only jump in the domestic price level: 
surprises do not happen in the steady state.  The idea rather is that faster domestic inflation, 
operating through the mechanism just described, exerts a small negative effect on its real rate 
of interest.  So the gap between the debtor’s and the creditor’s real rate of interest shrinks.  
And because real overseas debts are proportional to this gap, that is why real debt charges will 
then have to go down.   
 
 
4: THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
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Now that we have solved for the steady state flow of real debt charges across the exchanges, 
we can begin to address the issue of the steady state real exchange rate, X.  The balance of 
payments accounts will be stationary in units of home product when the value of domestic 
imports equals domestic exports plus Γ.  So we may write: 
 
        Γ + = * h f c X c                                                                                               (12) 
 
Furthermore, in the steady state, investment will have vanished, and nominal borrowing will 
match any erosion of real debt due to inflation.  Our assumptions on preferences imply that 
) )( 1 ( Γ + − = f X c f η  and that  ] * [ * * Γ − = X f ch η .  The long run value of the real 
exchange rate is therefore given by 
 
       * * / ] ) * ( ) 1 [( f f X η η η η Γ − + − = .                                                              (13) 
 
(13) tells us that the real exchange rate will be independent of international debts if and only 
if foreign and domestic consumption preferences are the same ( *) η η = .  A home bias in 
preferences will imply a boost to the lender’s terms of trade; an anti-home bias implies a dent.  
These results follow, at least, for given levels of home and foreign output.   
 
 
The intuition here is straightforward.  Persistent impatience differences imply that foreigners 
must eventually keep transferring to domestic residents, as a consequence of their relatively 
high consumption in the past, and the debts that resulted from this.   A transfer benefits the 
transferor, by improving his terms of trade, when the sum of the two countries’ marginal 
import propensities exceeds unity (the “Keynes-Samuelson” condition).  This happens in our 
case when  η η > * , and not otherwise.  A home bias in preferences implies the opposite – the 
transferor suffers the secondary burden of a terms of trade deterioration. 
 
 
Our remarks about the real exchange rate are premature however.   The levels of output at 
home and abroad have been taken as given.  But capital and labour, upon which output 
depends, are both endogenous.  So a proper solution for the real exchange rate requires further 
analysis.  
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Each country’s supply of local goods is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, differing only in a 
Hicks-neutral technology coefficient: 
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There is perfect competition, so that  ) 1 /( / 2 γ γ − = = hf kR f , with similar conditions 
holding abroad (where, due to (8), capital’s marginal product is R*).  As returns to scale are 
constant, the capital labour ratio is a function of the local real interest rate: in country i, 
) 1 /( 1 ] / [ ) / (
γ γ




The next stage is to employ the labour supply-consumption and wealth – consumption trade-
offs in the two countries, contained within (2), (3), (7) and (8). They enable us to solve for 
domestic and foreign output, and the nominal and real exchange rates. We shall do this in 
stages.  First, use the production functions, the long run budget constraints, and the first order 
conditions on labour and consumption.  These allow one to relate each country’s output to its 
real wage rate (which is negatively related to its local real interest rate) and to the flow of real 
servicing costs on external claims between them.  We may therefore write: 
 
Ξ Γ − = / } { 2 θ f f                                                                       (15) 
Ξ Γ + = / } / * { * 2 X f f θ                                                            (16) 
 
where  θ γ + − ≡ Ξ 1 .  It is interesting to observe that the real debt charges paid by foreigners 
to home residents reduce output at home and raise it abroad.  The reason here is that leisure is 
a normal good.  The exogenous income that home residents receive dulls the incentive to 
work.  Abroad, debt charges are a spur to labour.   
 
 
Equation (15) is in fact a solution for home output (the marginal product of labour depends 
negatively on R, and R, R* and debt charges have all been solved in terms of exogenous 
variables).  On the other hand, (16) is not really a solution for the foreign country’s output, 
because of the presence of the real exchange rate, X.   (It is a solution, however, if one 
redefines debt charges in units of foreign output).  But an equation for the real exchange rate   15
has already been found, in terms of home output, foreign output and debt charges.  This is 
(13).  So we may combine (13), (15) and (16), to yield 
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It is worth exploring (17) in some detail.  The real exchange rate may be thought of as the 
home country’s terms of trade – and a rise means a deterioration.  So we see an increase in the 
domestic technology coefficient, T,  relative to its foreign counterpart, T*, leading to a 
worsening in the home terms of trade: if home products are more plentiful, they must get 
cheaper.   Then there are the demand parameters.  An increased preference for home goods on 
the part of domestic residents means a rise in η , and in  * η on the part of foreigners, and in 
both cases (17) reveals that the home terms of trade must improve.  The role of R*/R, 
apparent in the first term on the right hand side of (17), arises because an increase in the 
relative cost of capital abroad will make inhibit foreign production relative to home, and 
foreign goods will get scarcer.   
 
 
Next, there is the role played by real debt charges.  As (17) reveals, these are highly likely to 
act as a drag on the real exchange rate, improving the terms of trade at home. Inspect the 
square bracketed term in the coefficient on Γ.  This is very likely to be positive.  Positive it 
must be, if commodity preferences are similar, or tilted towards local goods (home bias).   
 
 
The key reason for this is that larger debt charges must stimulate labour abroad and inhibit it 
at home, as we have already seen in the context of (15) and (16).  Underlying this is the idea 
that the country where residents are more patient (home) will have spent time sacrificing not 
just consumption of the two goods, but also leisure, in the past, in anticipation of deferred 
gratification later on.  Less patient foreign residents will have done the opposite, and are 
having to spend their steady state “paying” for the pleasure of previous leisure.   
 
 
Yet there is just a possibility, however, that the borrower’s terms of trade improve with the 
size of his borrowing, and that is what will in fact happen when preferences are so strongly 
biased against local products that these labour supply effects are offset.   The strength of this   16
bias must be very high, and the chance of its occurrence absolutely minimal.  It is, however, a 




5. THE NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE 
 
 
To obtain the equilibrium (steady state) nominal exchange rate at a moment t, we need to 
explore (2), (3), (7) and (8) in further detail.  The expressions for wealth-amplified money (or 
money-amplified wealth) have to be brought into play. They are not, unfortunately, 
particularly simple.  Let us assume that each country’s monetary authority controls both the 
level and the growth rate of the nominal stock of its local-currency money.   In the steady 
state, with no trend in population or technology, inflation will equal the rate of nominal 
money growth in each currency.  Furthermore, the real exchange rate will be trendless, 
implying no drift in relative prices, so that the rate of increase in the nominal, local-currency 




It helps to begin by recalling the definitions of “money amplified wealth”, in units of home 
country product, given in (3) and (8): in the home country, we have 
h h P D P S D S D m k / ] ) 2 / * 1 ( * ) 1 ( [ + − + + + ≡ Λ ξ σ and  in  the  foreign  country,                                 
h h P P D D S D S m X k / )] 2 / 1 ( * ) 1 ( * [ * * ξ σ + − − + + ≡ Λ .  Meanwhile, (3) also gave us   
) ( / R ch − = Λ β η ζ , and (8),  *) * ( * / * * R ch − = Λ β η ζ .                                
 
  
If σ were allowed to be infinite, the nominal exchange rate (on the steady state path) at any 
date t would be given by 
 
S =   *)] ( * [ * * / ] ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( [ 2 2 θη η θ γ η η − Ξ Γ + + − Γ − − f r m f mr        (18) 
 
Here the nominal exchange rate would be proportional to relative nominal money supplies (at 
that date), and also to the ratio of nominal interest rates, r/r*.   A higher nominal interest rate 
at home would betoken faster domestic inflation and lower real home money demand.  There 
would also be a positive influence on S from the domestic real wage rate, which is negatively   17
related to R and positively to domestic output, signifying a weaker terms of trade for the home 
country; and debt charges would exert an unambiguously negative effect. 
 
 
Equation (18) would hold when money dominated wealth in the utility function so strongly 
that the latter effectively vanished from the scene.  So it would be a very special case.  It is 
also a case – one of two as we shall see in the following section – where the model effectively 
collapses.  With σ  finite, on the other hand, we are in much safer (if rather more complex) 
territory.  In these circumstances, S is given by 
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J , and lastly 
. * * / )) 1 *)( ( *) 1 ( ( * R r η γ η η η θ γ − − + − ≡ Ψ    
 
 
Nonetheless, (19) shares some features with (18), notably the proportionality of the nominal 
exchange rate in the ratios of home to foreign nominal money stocks, and home to foreign 
nominal interest rates.  If the term in ℵdominates the coefficients on Γin the numerator and 
denominator of (19), as appears highly likely, the impact of debt charges on the equilibrium 




6. TWO PATHOLOGICAL CASES WHERE THE MODEL COLLAPSES 
 
 
There are two cases where our model disintegrates.  One arises when money dominates 
wealth in the utility function so strongly that the latter effectively disappears.  This arises, as 
we saw in the previous section, when the parameter σ is infinite.  The problem here is that 
the two sets of Euler conditions (equation (3) for the home residents, and (8) for the 
foreigners) get infected with a bug that breaks the equalities.  To be specific, Λ and  * Λ    18
become infinite.  The direct marginal utility of a stock of non-money assets, whether physical 
capital or net external claims, will vanish.  The local-currency bond/capital/money tradeoffs 
still hold.  But the real interest rate now equals the local residents’ rate of impatience, and 
there is nothing to tie down relationships between real interest rates in the two economies, nor 
any way of determining the mix of currencies in which any foreign lending or borrowing is 
conducted.   Worse still, the steady state has the property that the most patient owns 
everything, the feature that this paper’s model was primarily built to avoid.  
 
 
The same problem can also occur when the value of σ  is finite.  It arises in one special case, 
when countries aim for a “full liquidity” equilibrium by setting their rates of nominal money 
growth (and hence inflation) equal to minus the local real interest rate.   That will drive R to 
β , and R* to β *, with just the same consequences.  Real currency stocks will be infinite, 
and non-money wealth will cease to play a role.  So it is crucial that the two countries’ central 
banks disobey the Friedman rule, if the bridge between the two countries that the wealth-
amplified-money functions have allowed us to construct. 
 
 
7.  REAL INTEREST RATES, AND THE LONG RUN EFFECTS OF ALLOWING 
CROSS BORDER LENDING 
 
 
Several papers address the important questions about international capital movements.   
Examples include: why they often flow from poor to rich countries (Lucas (1990), Alfaro, 
Kalemi-Ozcan and Volosoyvych (2003)); whether they are harmful or beneficial (Obstfeld 
(1998)); and what is likely to happen if a country removes restrictions on them (Hunyh and 
Sinclair (2003)).   Our model can help to throw light on these issues.  
 
 
 It is a key feature of this model that real interest rates in each of the two countries depend on 
only three parameters: the rate of impatience shared by its citizens (β ), the special additional 
emphasis on real money holdings in the wealth term in their utilities (σ ), and the country’s 
rate of inflation (π ).  The first two are positive influences, and the third is negative. 
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One direct implication of this is that international borrowing and lending have no effect on 
countries’ real interest rates, which remain, in the steady state, at the long run values they 
would have displayed had cross-border lending not occurred.   A second, already noted, is 
that this model makes money non-superneutral.  Faster local inflation, if maintained, reduces 
the local long run real interest rate.  The mechanism is that faster inflation squeezes real 
money balances, and this raises the marginal utility of wealth, in response to which more 
capital is accumulated, bringing its marginal product down.  The consequence of this will be 
an increase in the country’s output.   Later, in section 9, we investigate a variant of the model 
that displays monetary superneutrality (and a further modification which makes inflation a 
damaging influence on real output). 
 
 
Although opening up the countries to cross border lending leaves their real interest rates 
unchanged, it does bring other effects of note.  The borrower now has debts to service.  Real 
debt servicing costs raise the debtor’s labour supply, and reduce the creditor’s, since leisure is 
a normal good.  This tends to raise the debtor’s output, and reduce the creditor’s.  This 
tendency is reinforced by changes in long run stocks of capital in the two countries.  For the 
debtor, net wealth has fallen; its enhanced marginal utility triggers accumulation.  The 
opposite occurs in the creditor country.  All these developments tend to improve the creditor’s 
terms of trade, since his product is now scarcer in world markets.  The debtor’s real exchange 
rate depreciates.  This must happen if goods preferences are similar or home-biased. 
 
  
8.  CHANGES IN CERTAIN PARAMETERS 
 
 
Suppose everyone becomes less reluctant to hold assets or debts denominated in foreign 
currency.  This might come about for a variety of reasons.  Access to forward markets, where 
hedging can occur, might become easier or cheaper.  Changes in central banks’ policy, or a 
reduced incidence of serious shocks, might lower anticipated volatility in nominal exchange 
rates.  Or there could develop, from at least the creditor’s standpoint, the closer 
correspondence between the preference for foreign goods in consumption, and preference for 
foreign assets in the portfolio, that theory would lead us to predict – with the possible 
implication that claims expressed in foreign currency became less unpalatable. 
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What any of these changes imply is a fall in the parameter ξ .  Since overseas debt charges 
are inversely proportional to ξ , a reduction would imply a greater long run level of real inter-
country claims, and, as a consequence, a very likely (but, as we have seen, not quite certain) 
deterioration in the debtor’s terms of trade.   
 
 
Exactly the same consequences could be expected from an increased gap between the debtor’s 
and the creditor’s real rate of interest, R*-R.   This would normally happen if the difference 
between the two countries’ impatience rates increased, or if the creditor’s rate of inflation 
increased relative to the debtor’s: in each case, any positive difference between R* and R 
would tend to rise.   
 
 
But the long run effects of a permanent change in one country’s rate of inflation do not 
operate just through their impact on real overseas debt servicing flows and from them to the 
real exchange rate.  There are direct output effects, too.  If country 1 raises its rate of nominal 
money growth in perpetuity, its inflation rises, and its real rate of interest slips back a little.  
That means that capital is a cheaper factor of production, and, all else equal, country 1’s 
steady state output level will rise.  But higher output can only imply a worsened terms of 
trade.           
 
 
Up to now, both population sizes have been normalized to one.  Increasing the home 
country’s population relative to the foreign country’s will have the following effects.  The 
worldwide supply of domestic output rises, so its relative price (1/X) must fall.  As far as 
external claims are concerned, the enlarged population in the home country increases the ratio 
of home-currency denominated claims, relative to those expressed in foreign currency.  Debt 
per head in the foreign country rises, while external claims per head in the home country will 






The model embeds a Tobinesque view of the world (Tobin (1965) sees a rise in inflation as a 
portfolio-reshaping phenomenon that increases capital in the long run).  Portfolios matter, and   21
substitution between money and other assets occurs.  Higher local inflation squeezes real 
money holdings, reducing wealth.  The increased marginal utility of wealth then raises the 
attractiveness of capital, and net credits.  An enlarged capital stock then tends to imply a 
higher level of domestic output.   Some will object that money should be superneutral for 
capital and output, or that supernonneutrality might go the other way. It is the purpose of this 




Superneutrality will arise if the utility from non-money net wealth is additively separable 
from the utility of real balances.  Let us therefore amend the home and foreign agents’ 
optimization problem from the maximization of (1) and (5) to  
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and  I is an indicator variable that is unitary for the “home” country, 1, and zero for 2.     
Country i’s representative resident consumes  1 i c units of country 1’s product and  2 i c units of 
2’s.  The variables  1 2 1 , , D r r  and  2 D  denote, respectively, the nominal interest rates ruling in 
each country, and the stock of country 1’s claims against 2 denominated in 1’s and 2’s 
currency. Previously, these were r, r*, D and D*. 
 
 
The intratemporal conditions for optimization remain as in the previous model.  So, too, do 
the expressions for Γ, the tradeoffs in both countries between physical capital and each of the 
two debt instruments, and the link between the real exchange rate and the two countries’   22
output levels.  The big change is the Euler conditions for money, which now imply that the 
equilibrium nominal exchange rate, at an instant t in the steady state, will equal 
 
) ( * ) (
) )))( 1 ( ( ) 1 ( )( (
2 2 2 1
1 1 21 1 2
π β η µ
π β γ η θ η µ
+




S                                                      (21) 
 
All else equal, then, the larger the real debt service flow, the cheaper the debtor’s currency 
will be in terms of the creditor’s.  Thus the nominal exchange rate solution is much simpler 
than in the previous model.   
 
 
Another change is that the two countries’ real interest rates are now endogenous variables.  
They are no longer locked at values fixed by the two countries’ discount and inflation rates 
and the parameter σ (which has now departed from the scene), and independent of the size of 
international claims.  In particular, their values are now affected by the scale of inter-country 
lending.  In financial autarky (denote this by an additional subscript A) either country’s steady 
state real interest rate depends on three parameters.  These are the profit share of income, γ , 
the preference parameter on (now non-monetary) wealth, ζ , and the discount rate on utility, 
i β :  . ] / 1 [
1 − + = γ ζ βi i R   Cross-border lending narrows the gap between the two countries’ 
real interest rates.  But it does not eliminate them.   How far the process goes depends on each 
country’s residents marginal distaste for claims or debts in the other’s currency, the parameter 
ξ .  The size of the remaining gap between the two real interest rates is proportional to ξ . 
 
 
This new model consists of six key equations.  Four of them are unchanged (except for 
notation: the starred country is subscripted 2, and the unstarred home country 1): 
-  (1) the relation between the real exchange rate, the real debt service flow, and the two 
countries’ output levels (13); 
-  (2) the links between each country’s output, its real wage rate, and the debt service flow 
((15) and (16)) ; 
-  (3) the solution for real debt service flow (11). 
The new ones express each country’s optimization condition for capital, and may be written:  
 
    }] / ]} 2 / 1 [ { )[ ( ) ( 1 1 2 2 1 1 1
1 P P S D S D D k R f ξ β ζ − + + − = Γ +                                   (22) 
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2 P P D D S D kX R X f ξ β ζ + + − − = Γ −                                 (23) 
 
where 
1 f  and 
2 f denote output in the two countries.  
 
 
Substitution between these six equations reduces to a pair of equations in the ratio of the real 
wage rate in country 1 to the real debt service flow, each of which depends on the two real 
interest rates alone.  These are implicit functions; solution is easiest when  * 5 . 0 η η γ = = = . 
It becomes clear that real interest rates are drawn together somewhat, but not equalized 
(unless ξ were to vanish).  
 
 
The fact that the steady state real interest rate in each country is now independent of its rate of 
inflation reflects the superneutrality of money that has been imposed in (20), the moment real 
balances have been split from the rest of the portfolio. A higher rate of sustained inflation in 
one country would bring just three effects, all local and purely nominal: real balances fall, and 
with it utility, and, from (21), the external nominal value of its currency (for a given level of 
the nominal money supply).     There is just one qualification here: the higher rate of inflation 
considered here must be fully foreseen by the parties to the cross-border loans.     
  
 
A second variant on the original model presented in this paper could make sustained inflation 
reduce output, rather than raise it or leave it unchanged.  The simplest way of doing that 
would be to delete real balances as an explicit argument of utility, and, instead, model money 
as a device for saving time or resources.  So leisure might be redefined as what remains from 
a time endowment of 1 once both labour time (h) and “shopping time” (s, say) had been 
subtracted.  With s decreasing and convex in real balances, agents optimize by setting the 
local nominal interest rate equal to  s′ − , multiplied by the real wage rate.  That equality 
expresses balance between the marginal benefit from holding money (time saved, valued at 
the wage) and its marginal (opportunity) cost.  In such a case, the effect of faster inflation in 
squeezing real balances would raise shopping time; with Cobb Douglas utility, both leisure 
and labour supply would fall.  In the steady state, capital would be reduced 
equiproportionately, so local output would come down, and not rise as in the original model.   
In most other respects, the analysis is very similar – or identical - to the first variant upon our 
original model. 
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10.  ANSWERS TO OUR INITIAL QUESTIONS 
 
 
Real interest rates diverge, even when, as in the steady state, real exchange rates are trendless. 
So uncovered interest parity condition does not hold. In the main model of our paper, cross 
border lending has no impact on countries’ real interest rates.  In the variant considered in the 
previous section, it brings them closer, but does not equalize them. 
 
 
The currency mix for cross border loans can be inferred directly from our model: the ratio of 
debtor-currency loans to creditor-currency loans (expressed in either currency) equals the 
ratio of the debtor’s discount rate-real interest differential to the creditor’s.  In the main model 
of this paper, this reduces to the ratio of their nominal interest rates.  This follows from 
assuming that both countries’ residents have a common marginal distaste for instruments 
denominated in alien currency.  Had this preference parameter differed between the countries, 
the country with a greater willingness to digest instruments denominated in the other’s 




It is a general feature of the main model, and its variants, that the debtor’s output rises, and 
that the creditor’s falls, following the adoption of free capital movements.  Wealth (or real 
interest) and labour supply effects both work in the same direction here.  Such steady state 
output effects imply that the creditor’s terms of trade should improve.   So it will experience a 
real exchange rate appreciation.   
 
 
On question (iv), relating to inflation, results differed sharply between the main model and its 
variants.  In the former, inflation favoured output by reducing the real interest rate.  So higher 
inflation for a creditor would tend to increase its lending, while faster inflation in a debtor 
country would reduce the steady state stock of its debt.  The real exchange rate effects of 
inflation are governed chiefly by their output effects (the terms of trade deteriorating for a 
country whose output has risen) although there are also impacts from real debt servicing 
flows when commodity preferences differ. 
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The equilibrium level of inter-country loans is governed primarily by the real interest 
differential between borrower and lender, and the parameter reflecting each country’s 
residents’ increasing dislike of credits or debits in the other’s currency.  The ratio of the real 
interest differential to that parameter is approximately half the equilibrium debt service flow. 
In variant models, however, the picture is complicated by the fact that the real interest rate 
differential is endogenous – shrinking as the size of loans rises. 
 
 
The equilibrium nominal exchange rate is trended by the two countries’ inflation differential, 
which, in the steady state, matches the difference in their nominal money growth rates.  The 
level at an instant is proportional to local-currency nominal money supplies then, but also 
varies in the usual fashion with relative incomes and (at least approximately) relative nominal 
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